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  This study focuses on the incentives and risk-taking behavior of large 
shareholders in Thailand before and after the 1997 financial crisis. The results show that 
there is a negative association between risk and firm performance. However, the effect 
ore cash flow 
re members of 
top management. Furthermore, there is weak evidence that a move to more transparent 
ructure benefits the firms. Overall, the results indicate that 
ownership-based incentives are an effective means of aligning the interests between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders particularly in the post-crisis period. 
JEL classification: G32 










of risk matters less in the firms in which controlling shareholders hold m
rights. Strikingly, after the crisis, the second largest shareholders from families appear to 
have significant and positive influence on firms, especially when they a
direct control st
  11.  I
y devices that 
e among other 
ation between 
management and ownership in widely held firms. One possible solution to the problems 
created by dispersed shareholding structure is to have ownership concentrated in the 
 ownership is 
often involved 
h concentrated 
ownership, it is expected that the interests between large and minority shareholders 
should be more aligned. However, as controlling shareholders have sufficient power to 
h flow rights, they have more 
ince 88; Burkart et 
 
financial incentives or cash flow rights (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
A growing number of studies have investigated the efficacy of concentrated 
r, very little is 
mption of private 
bene arkets. Given 
two contradicting arguments with respect to the share of control, there is no clear 
consensus if the share ownership of other shareholders provides monitoring role or 
facilitates managerial entrenchment. Therefore, the effect remains an empirical issue. 
Although the literature within an agency framework focuses on how the risk of 
ntroduction 
How can agency problems be alleviated? What are disciplinar
reduce the scope for expropriation and managerial opportunism? These ar
issues since Berle and Means (1932) raised the concern over the separ
hands of a few large shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Recent studies contrast with Berle and Means (1932) in that
highly concentrated rather than dispersed, and that large shareholders are 
in the management (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000). Wit
control firms and have control rights in excess of cas
ntives to expropriate minority shareholders (Grossman and Hart, 19
al., 1998; Wolfenzon, 1999). Accordingly, the incentives to expropriate vary with their
ownership of the largest shareholders as a monitoring incentive. Howeve
known about the role of other large shareholders in reducing the consu
fits of control by controlling shareholders particularly in emerging m
  2expropriation by managers and controlling shareholders should be man
need a broader conceptualization of how the alleviation of the risk exposu
Given that risk and effort are comparably important in principal-agent fra
important to integrate other types of risks in addition to expropria
aged, we still 
re is important. 
mework, it is 
tion risk into 
agency-based research to understand whether risks and incentives influence the agent’s 
decision making that subsequently affects firm performance.   
 effort-averse. 
ey may have 
 variability in 
ts that greater 
firm risk hurts shareholders because it reduces the present value of the firm’s tax 
benefits of debts (Leland, 1999), and increases the present value of financial distress 
centives that are 
align at reduce risk 
 performance. 
Despite its importance, the impact of risk on performance has frequently been ignored. 
This study extends agency theory research by focusing on the joint effects of 
The objectives 
er the effect of risk-taking behavior on firm 
perf m in emerging 
market, (2) to examine whether the role duality of the largest shareholder and the 
presence of the second largest shareholder affect firm performance, and (3) to study the 
impact of unwinding indirect shareholding structure. 
This study uses non-financial firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand in 
Agency theory argues that managers are self-interested, risk- and
When managers (controlling shareholders) are not well diversified, th
incentives to reduce variability in the firm’s return since they do not like
their wealth (Eisenhardt, 1989). The literature on capital structure sugges
costs. Thus, in high-risk firms, the controlling shareholders without in
ed with other shareholders may be unwilling to take actions th
exposure, which can subsequently produce deleterious effect on firm
ownership mechanism and internal corporate risk on firm performance. 
of this paper are: (1) to investigate wheth
ormance depends on ownership-based incentive-alignment mechanis
  31996 and 2000. The Thai sample provides a unique opportunity to stu
issues since the Thai economy was affected dramatically from the 1997 f
Covering pre- and post-crisis periods, this study investigates change
governance. It is important to note that, after the onset of the financial c
control mechanism rather than pyramidal or cross-shareholding structur
et al. (2003) and Anuchitworawong et al. (2003) confirm this evidence for
and financial firms respectively. Third, the Stock Exchange of Commissio
the code of best practice that focuses on fairness, transparenc
dy governance 
inancial crisis. 
s in corporate 
risis in 1997, 
there are at least three important changes in corporate governance context. First, 
ownership becomes more concentrated. Second, large investors turn to use direct 
es. Khanthavit 
 non-financial 
n has enforced 
y, accountability, and 
responsibility. Thus, these changes are expected to have certain implications in the 
alleviation of agency problems in a country that experiences financial turmoil   
he largest and 
after the crisis. 
 the effect of 
risk-taking behavior. After financial crisis, there is an apparent and positive linkage 
between ownership and firm performance in the firms that encounter high financial and 
 practices that 
 through role 
dual le duality of 
controlling shareholders is tied with their equity wealth, the effect of agency problem is 
smaller. Lastly, there is relatively weak evidence that supports the benefits from 
unwinding such indirect control mechanisms as pyramid or cross-shareholding method.     
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarizes theoretical background 
The results show that ownership concentrated in the hands of t
second largest shareholders becomes important governance mechanisms 
Their higher ownership stakes raises interest alignment and reduces
business risk. This may reflect the improvement in corporate governance
have been promoted by the authority. Next, the concentration of power
ity exacerbates potential conflicts of interest. But once the ro
  4and hypotheses. Section 3 presents information on data and methodology used in the 
in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
nd and hypotheses 
2.1 O
The costs and benefits of having large shareholders are at least theoretically 
clear. The research on managerial discretion and firm performance dates back to Berle 
ip and control and argue that 
man ior causes a 
ected to raise 
excess perquisite consumption when they own only a fraction of the firms’ shares. 
Therefore, increasing managerial ownership may mitigate the problem. Although 
mon x post, it may 
that there is a 
However, large shareholding does not come without a cost. Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985) argue that large shareholders are not well diversified and have to bear excess 
evidence that, 
ration creates 
may hurt the 
interests of minority shareholders through expropriation (La Porta et al., 2002). The 
problem becomes more serious if this shareholder holds less cash flow rights. 
Specifically, a high discrepancy between cash flow rights and control rights of 
controlling shareholders exerts a negative and significant effect on firm value 
study. Empirical results are presented 
2.  Theoretical backgrou
wnership-based incentives 
and Means (1932), who caution against separating ownersh
agers do not pursue the interests of shareholders. Such behav
principal-agent problem as suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976).   
Jensen and Meckling (1976) point out that managers are exp
itoring by large shareholders may restrict the misuse of resources e
blunt ex ante managerial initiative (Burkart et al., 1997). This suggests 
trade-off between control and initiative. 
risks due to wealth vested in firms. Recent studies provide convincing 
especially in countries with lax minority protection, ownership concent
private benefits of control in which a controlling (or large) shareholder 
  5(Claessens et al., 2002 for eight East Asian economies; La Porta et al
wealthiest economies). To the extent that control mechanisms lead to d
one-share-one-vote rule, the controlling shareholders will have control a
to pursue for private interests inc
, 2002 for 27 
eviations from 
nd opportunity 
ompatible with other shareholders’ interests (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997; Bebchuk et al., 1999).   
From these arguments, higher cash-flow rights of large shareholders may 
and by raising 
e shareholders. . Hence, we expect that: 
H1:  areholders is 
Recent research suggests that firms do not have only one large shareholder. 
Lehmann and Weigand (2000) document that about 34 percent of 361 firms in their 
Germ  (2001) report 
pectively have 
La Porta et al. (1999) show that large controlling shareholders are often 
involved in the management of firms. Therefore, the effectiveness of the monitoring by 
e the problem 
monitoring by 
9) argue that 
bargaining problems among shareholders may constrain the controlling shareholders’ 
behavior and enforce them to be less prone to tunneling. However, it could happen that 
the sharing of control may create internal conflicts among controlling shareholders. In 
addition, it is possible that they collude and pursue private benefits at the expense of 
benefit atomistic shareholders, by increasing monitoring of management 
the costs of expropriation for the larg
The level of cash flow rights held by the largest controlling sh
positively associated with firm performance.   
any sample have more than one large owner. Similarly, Faccio et al.
that about 45 percent and 32 percent of firms in Europe and Asia res
multiple large shareholders with at least 10 percent of control rights. 
controlling shareholders who are also in control is questionable. To resolv
in question when other mechanisms such as takeover threats and the 
large blockholders do not work effectively, Gomes and Novaes (199
  6other small shareholders (Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000). 
Empirically, Lehmann and Weigand (2000) find that the presence of 
owner improves profitability, consistent with Boehmer (2000). Faccio
examine the effect of multiple large owners on dividends. They find that t
another large 
 et al. (2001) 
he presence of 
multiple large shareholders helps to limit the expropriation of minority shareholders by 
controlling shareholder in Europe, but exacerbates agency problem in Asia countries 
like  multiple large 
ultiple large shareholders. 
rol power. By 
taking the ownership-based incentives into consideration, we expect that: 
H2: The level of cash-flow rights held by the second largest shareholder who is involved 
rformance are 
mixed. There are two competing arguments on how ownership concentration affects the 
risk-taking behavior of managers. On one hand, the corporate finance literature suggests 
iated with firm 
valu ating to asset 
 that a firm’s 
equity will be more valuable if it chooses more risky investments. Essentially, by 
increasing the risk of assets, shareholders transfer wealth from creditors to themselves. 
  On the other hand, by relaxing the Modigliani-Miller assumptions in the 
literature on capital structure, we are in an imperfect world with transaction costs and 
Japan, Philippines, and South Korea. However, they report no 
owners in their sample of 137 Thai firms. 
  These studies have focused only on the presence of m
However, it is relatively important to account for incentives and cont
in the management is positively associated with firm performance. 
2.2 Firm risk and ownership 
  The impacts of instability in the firms’ operations on firm pe
that increases in firm risk or cash flow volatility are positively assoc
e for firms with growth opportunities. According to the view rel
substitution problem, the implication of option pricing model reveals
  7asymmetric information. Under the setting, firm value can be improv
wealth maximizing agents reduce variability in a firm’s future cash fl
expect a negative association between variability and firm value. Him
(1999) argue that riskier firms have lower Tobin’s q. But the impact dep
ed if rational 
ows. Thus we 
melberg et al. 
ends on how 
much a risk-averse manager can be incentivized via equity ownership. The risk 
management literature also suggests that risk management activities benefit principals 
principals. 
wnership, the 
 more hedging 
ortfolio might 
not be well diversified and, therefore, as her ownership increases, she has an incentive 
to reduce the risk of the firm’s assets. Zhang (1998) notifies that the under-diversified 
cont  shareholders. 
increases, the 
Since neither risk reduction nor wealth transfer argument precludes the 
existence of the other effect, the relationship between ownership and risk taking 
r. However, investing in riskier 
eater effort on 
ill be affected by the decisions made. One way that 
may reduce the effect from risky behavior is to have managers hold some ownership so 
that their welfare will be tied with their own effort and performance. 
H3: The level of cash flow rights of the largest controlling shareholders reduces the 
negative effect of risk on firm performance.   
and agents when the incentives of the agents are aligned with those of the 
Smith and Stulz (1985) argue that the greater the managerial o
more risk averse the managers are and hence they may prefer to adopt
and other risk management strategies. The reason is that a manager’s p
rolling shareholder is more averse to risky projects than small minority
Similarly, Chen et al. (1998) show that as ownership concentration 
incentives to take excessive risky activities decrease. 
behavior will depend on which effect dominates the othe
assets increases the risk of the manager's portfolio, and usually requires gr
the part of manager whose earning w




independent of the influence of the management, implying that the positions of board 
chairman and chief executive should not be held by the same person. Proponents of 
etter strategic 
dependent chairman. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1997) 
dem nowledge of a 
However, from agency perspective, when a CEO is also chairman of the board 
of directors, this CEO may not separate private interests from the shareholders’ interests 
is CEO 
Jensen, 1983; 
en, 1993). This would lead to lower efficiency of the board. Given that the costs 
from decreased monitoring of the CEO dominate the benefits from better strategic 
perspectives, potential agency problems caused by the concentration of power are 
 with a chairman of the board title, 
 better aligned 
with the interests of other shareholders when CEO ownership increases higher. 
H4: Firms with the largest shareholder who serves as both board chairman and CEO 
have performance poorer than firms without such a shareholder. 
H5: The level of cash flow rights held by the largest shareholder who serves as both 
ole duality 
The issue of CEO duality has received considerable attention w
results. Theoretically, the interests of shareholders will be protected wh
have the same interests aligned with shareholders, or when board 
CEO duality argue that a chairman who holds the CEO title provides b
vision and leadership than an in
onstrate that insiders are more effective because they have superior k
firm and its industry than outside directors. 
(Jensen, 1993). Corporate board would also be unable to effectively control th
who has considerable managerial influence over the board (Fama and 
Jens
worse. 
By accounting for the incentives of the CEO
we expect that the interests of a CEO with board chairman title should be
  9board chairman and CEO is positively associated with firm performance. 
2.4 I
 Raviv (1988) 
h the costs of 
private benefits that controlling shareholders can extract. Burkart et al. (1997) examine 
the trade-off between ownership structure and managerial initiative and conclude that 
are beneficial in terms of enhancing effective 
mon  it constitutes 
wnership, and 
dual-class shares cause a separation between ownership and control rights, and are 
likely to create large agency costs (Grossman and Hart, 1988; Harris and Raviv, 1988; 
rolling shareholders hold large control rights but very 
e internalizing 
estment when it fails because the cost will be shared with 
other shareholders. Hence, we expect that: 
H6: Firms that have control mechanism changed from indirect to direct shareholding 
We examine the empirical hypotheses developed above using a cross section of 
data for firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) in 1996 and 2000. The 
separate time periods aim at comparing the effects in the pre- and post-crisis periods. 
The 2000 sample is used since firms become more stable after being affected by the 
ndirect control mechanism 
  Classical studies by Grossman and Hart (1988) and Harris and
show that a deviation form one-share-one-vote rule is associated wit
highly concentrated voting rights 
itoring of managers, but reduce their non-contractible efforts because
an ex-ante expropriation threat to managers.   
Indirect shareholding structures such as pyramiding, cross-o
Bebchuk et al., 1999). When cont
small cash flow rights, they can secure private benefits of control, whil
only part of the cost of inv
structure have better performance. 
3.  Data and measurements 
3.1 Sample characteristics 
  10financial crisis in 1997. We include listed firms: (1) that are not financ
because their capital structure and financing decisions are highly affected
restrictions, and (2) that have same accounting year ended Decemb
requirement for the 2000 sample is that firms must not be in the Com
2000 are available in this study. The paper covers at lea
ial institutions 
 by regulatory 
er. Additional 
panies under 
Rehabilitation section since their operations are not independent of the controlling 
authority. As a result, two principal sub-samples of 270 firms in 1996 and 244 firms in 
st 79 percent of all firms listed in 
the  ng to top 100 
ent sources of 
information about family relationship. The sources include Phipatseritham (1981), 
Phipatseritham and Yoshihara (1983), Suehiro (1989), and Sapphaibun (2001a and 
ng ownership 
Online (BOL) 
e Ministry of 
Commerce. Using these sources of information allows us to trace for ultimate 
shareholders of each firm and to compute their control and cash flow rights. I also 
collect additional data f d disclosure statements (Form 56-1) that 
are f ll listed firms. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
Table 1 reports the distribution of the sample by industry classifications. Our 
classifications differ from those of the SET. Because there are less than three listed 
stock market. At least 32.28 percent of all firms in the sample belo
wealthy families that own the largest number of shares in Thailand. 
This study is based on a unique ownership database and differ
2001b). Importantly, the information on all registered firms used in traci
of private firms at the layers of control chains is obtained from Business 
that offers the on-line database service with official data from th
rom annual reports an
iled to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) annually by a
------------------------------ 
  11firms in certain industries, I thus reclassify industry group as shown in 
sample accounts for about 53.09 and 67.27 percent of the book value of
all non-financial firms in 1996 and 2000 respectively. Total market c
the table. Our 
 total assets of 
apitalization of all 
firm pectively. 
With careful identification of ultimate owners, the sample firms are classified 
into two groups – single and multiple large shareholders. A single large controlling 
ds at least 25 
r a firm with multiple large shareholders, it has a controlling 
shar olders with at 
However, it is worth discussing whether the controlling and other large 
shareholders are competing for the control of a firm or colluding. In order to minimize 
the p entify ultimate 
r marriage, or 
The data shows that nearly 43.5 percent and 50 percent of firms with multiple 
owners in 1996 and 2000 respectively are made up of or owned by foreign investors and 
esting in firms 
 support from 
within a firm. 
Therefore, foreign investors tend to provide monitoring roles rather than to collude to 
obtain private benefits. For firms that are owned by a group of unrelated families, they 
are prone to collusion. Past evidence suggests that although unrelated firms may form a 
coalition, the disputes between families can lead to breaking up. Therefore, we believe 
s in the sample is about 67.53 and 92.42 percent in 1996 and 2000 res
shareholder is the largest shareholder of a firm, provided that he hol
percent of voting rights. Fo
eholder with at least 25 percent of control rights and other large shareh
least 10 percent of control rights.   
otential problem that both shareholders may collude, I carefully id
shareholders to see that they are not related especially through blood o
linked through cross-ownership, which might lead to collusion.   
local families. The literature shows that foreign investors may avoid inv
with poor governance and high corruption. Reduced level of potential
foreign shareholders can thus exert pressure to improve governance 
  12that each family prefers to protect its own long-term benefit. For instance
and Kantamanond families took a major stake in the Bank of Asia. Howev
failure of family-business management, the Euarchukiati family looked fo
and the Phatraprasit family replaced the Kantamanond family. The oth
, Euarchukaiti 
er, due to the 
r new partner,   
er evidence is 
between Piyaoui and Bulakul families that had large stake in Mah Boonkrong Drying 
and Silo. However, the firm faced serious financial problems. Therefore, the Piyaoui 
family that held nearly  ’s shares managed to remove the Bulakul 
family that previously c
------------ 
------------------------------ 
Table 2 reveals several features of ownership concentration based on types of 
ms had single 
f an individual 
 not reported in 
the table, the data shows that nearly 23.36 percent of all the firms in 2000 had new 
investors who emerged as the first or second largest shareholders in the firms. Out of 
se investors. 
es higher after 
 (Panel C). In 
both periods, more than 53 percent of all firms with multiple control structure were 
owned by individuals or related family members as the second largest shareholders. 
Third, the founders of the firms were still present as large shareholders in more than 
one-third of all firms. Lastly, there was an increase in number of firms where the first 
45 percent of the firm
ontrolled the firm.   
------------------
Insert Table 2 about here 
shareholders and managerial involvement. First, regardless of whether fir
or multiple owners, control rights are mostly concentrated in the hands o
or a group of related families, followed by foreign investors. Although
103 firms with multiple shareholders in 2000, 45 firms were owned by tho
Second, the proportion of firms with multiple large shareholders increas
the 1997 crisis, i.e. from 34.07 percent in 1996 to 42.21 percent in 2000
  13and second largest shareholders were involved in the firms’ management as board 
2 
rformance and 
ownership concentration together with its interaction in reducing the effect of the firm’s 
financial and business risks. Furthermore, we investigate whether the unwinding of 
g shareholder 
ine in this study are tested using 
or of the covariance. 
Tabl
Dependent variable: Industry-adjusted cash flow return on assets (ADJCFROA) 
Industry-adjusted cash flow return on assets (ADJCFROA) equals the sample 
y total assets 
mic efficiency 
 performance. 
Industry-adjusted measure is used in order to exclude industry effects. The industry 
median is the median CFROA of the publicly traded firms in the same industry as the 
ormance 
 stock market 
t available information especially 
                                                 
chairman or chief executive officer. 
3. Methodologies and variables for analysis 
    The study mainly examines the relationship between firm pe
indirect shareholding structure and the role of the largest controllin
improve firm performance. The hypotheses we exam
OLS regression and White heteroscedasticity-consistent estimat
e 3 gives summary definitions of variables used in this paper. 
firm’s earnings before depreciations, interests, and taxes divided b
(CFROA) less the industry median of CFROA. CFROA reflects the econo
of asset utilization, which provides a more focused measure of current
sample firm. Accounting-based measure is likely to represent better perf
measure than stock market-based measure for two reasons.
1 First, when
shows inefficiency, stock prices are less likely to reflec
 
1 Industry-adjusted Tobin’s q as a stock market-based measure that reflects growth 
opportunity is alternatively used as a dependent variable. However, explanatory 
variables in focus do not enter the regression models significantly. 
  14for infrequently trading stocks. Second, accounting profitability is more directly related 
 fi
a series of explanatory variables that I use to capture underlying 
a)  Cash flow rights of the largest shareholders (CFRIGHT1ST) 
Following Claessens et al. (2000), I compute cash flow rights of the controlling 
nership stakes 
e of cash flow 
trolling shareholder. In this study, a controlling shareholder 
is de  percent of the 
firm’s voting rights in aggregate.   
I collect the ownership structure data as of December 1996 and 2000, or the 
ugh blood or 
ple, I make sure 
s has been stable during the most recent 3 years 
for each sample period. Thus the potential problem of reverse causality that may arise 
between firm performance and ownership might not be much relevant in the sample.   
                                                 
to nancial survivability of the firm.   
    Following are 
factors for firm performance. 
shareholder as the sum of direct ownership and the product of the ow
along the chain of control. The CFRIGHT1ST variable is the percentag
rights held by the largest con
fined as a shareholder who directly and indirectly owns more than 25
2
closest date. Note that the shareholdings of individuals related thro
marriage are aggregated and reported as a single shareholder. In the sam
that the ownership structure of the firm
b)  The presence of multiple large shareholders 
2 According to the Public Limite
 
d Companies Act B.E. 2535 (1992) of Thailand, a 
shareholder can have absolute power over a firm if she owns more than 75% of the 
shares. Therefore, if a shareholder controls at least 25%, absolute control can be 
eliminated. This shareholder can block all major board decisions. This is also 
documented by Wiwattanakantang (2001). 
  15To examine whether the presence of multiple large shareholders
monitoring role or facilitate entrenchment, this study uses a du
(DSECONDLAR), which takes the value one if a firm has other large sharehold
hold at least 10 percent of voting rights and zero otherwise. Specifically,
 provides any 
mmy variable 
ers who 
 the variable is 
used to investigate whether the competition between multiple blockholders is successful 
in limiting tunneling and private benefits pursued by the largest shareholder.   
ir identity (La 
ze firms with 
olders, which 
include: 1) an individual or a group of related families, 2) a specially organized 
investment company of the royal family (Crown Property Bureau or CPB), 3) the 
ed as four dummy variables 
asso ge controlling 
d)  Cash flow rights of the second largest shareholders (CFRIGHT2ND) 
To account for the incentives of other large shareholders, I construct a variable 
t 10 percent of 
epresents their effort in controlling and 
usiness. Furthermore, I test the incentives of the second large 
shareholders when they are involved in the management by using the percentage of the 
cash flow rights owned by the second largest shareholders who serve as chairman of the 
board of directors or chief executive (CFRIGHT2NDBD). 
d) Financial  risk  (FINRISK) 
c)  Identity of the second largest shareholders 
In so far as the influence of the shareholders might vary with the
Porta et al., 2002; Boehmer, 2000; Megginson et al, 1994), I categori
multiple large shareholders according to types of the second largest shareh
government, and 4) foreign investors. The identity is assign
ciated with the types mentioned earlier. The firms with single lar
shareholder are used as the reference group. 
using cash flow rights of the second largest shareholders who hold at leas
voting rights (CFRIGHT2ND). This variable r
monitoring the firms’ b
  16Financial risk is the variability of net returns due to financ
associated with the use of borrowed funds. This research uses the standa
first differences in return on equity for the most recent five years to captu
financial risk on firm performance. Return on equity is the ratio of n
ial obligation 
rd deviation of 
re the effect of 
et income to total 
shareholders’ equity. The higher value of the variability reflects higher financial risk. 
e)   Business risk (BUSRISK) 
differences in 
rofit margin is 
s variable reflects the 
ing from the firm’s characteristics, independent of the way a 
firm is financed. The higher value of this measure implies higher business risk. 
f) Indirect shareholding structure 
e pyramids, 
that causes a 
ism, I classify 
firms into three groups – firms that have control mechanism changed from direct to 
indirect method, firms that have control mechanism changed from indirect to direct 
I construct 2 
roup as a base 
irm has its 
control mechanism changed from indirect shareholding in 1996 (1992) to direct 
shareholding in 2000 (1996) for the 2000 (1996) sample, and zero otherwise. The 
TOINDIRECT variable takes the value one if a firm has its control mechanism changed 
from direct shareholding in 1996 (1992) to indirect shareholding structure in 2000 
This measure is computed as the standard deviation of first 
operating profit margin during the most recent five years. Operating p
earnings before interests and taxes divided by total sales. Thi
uncertainty of income aris
From the literature, indirect control mechanisms lik
cross-shareholdings cause a deviation from one-share-one-vote rule, 
separation of ownership and control. To account for such indirect mechan
method, and firms that have no change in control mechanism. Then 
dummy variables – TODIRECT and TOINDIRECT – by using the last g
group for comparisons. The TODIRECT variable takes the value one if a f
  17(1996) for the 2000 (1996) sample, and zero otherwise.   
g) T
er who serves 
 A person who 
holds both positions have a significant power to control a firm and makes it difficult for 
the board of directors to effectively monitor the firm. So this is considered an agency 
e if the largest 
. 
enditures, and 
istics that may 
affect performance. All measures except market power are measured as of the end of the 
sample year. First, firm size is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. When a 
arge firm can 
verage is the 
ent of adverse 
conditions, it is the more highly geared companies that suffer, because of their 
obligations to make interest payments. Third, asset uniqueness is a measure of selling 
ting- and selling-related 
activities to differentiat petitors. Fourth, capital expenditures are 
measured by dividing t expenditures by its sales. Lastly, market 
power is captured by average Lerner index over the most recent 5 years. The index is 
the difference between sales and cost of sales, which is then divided by sales. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
he role duality of the largest shareholder 
This paper considers the role of the largest controlling sharehold
as both the chairman of the board and the chief executive officer (CEO).
problem. I construct the OWNDUAL variable that is a dummy equal to on
shareholder holds both board chairman and CEO titles, and zero otherwise
   I also include firm size, leverage, asset uniqueness, capital exp
market power of a firm into models to control for firm-specific character
firm is large, it is more difficult to monitor and control task. However, l
enjoy economies-of-scale and more market opportunities. Second, le
natural logarithm of the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. In the ev
intensity that captures a firm’s willingness to spend on marke
e the firm from its com
he firm’s net capital 
  18------------------------------ 
4.1 D
ployed in the 
analysis. Firms on average have performance relatively similar to other firms in the 
same industry in 1996 while performing a little better in 2000 with median 
est controlling 
ash flow rights 
also report similar figures for the 
cash flow rights of controlling shareholders in Thai firms with average cash flow rights 
at 44.66 percent and 45.27 percent in 1996 and 2000 respectively.   
n average 6.10 
t of 270 firms 
rcent. In 2000, 
103 out of 244 firms have other major shareholders who hold at least 10 percent level of 
voting rights. Within the sub-sample of 103 firms, these shareholders on average hold 
ne-third of all 
                                                 
4. Results 
escriptive statistics 
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics on a set of variables em
industry-adjusted ROA at nearly 0.34 percent.   
With respect to ownership concentration, we find that the larg
shareholders on average hold about 39.79 percent and 41.12 percent of c
in 1996 and 2000 respectively. Khanthavit et al (2003) 
For the second largest shareholders, their cash flow rights are o
percent and 7.93 percent in 1996 and 2000 respectively.
3 In 1996, 96 ou
have other major shareholders holding cash flow rights of about 17.90 pe
18.77 percent of cash flow rights. In addition, controlling shareholders who serve the 
dual roles of chairman of the board and the CEO are present in about o
firms. 
 
3  Maury and Pajuste (2002) show that the largest, second, and third largest shareholders 
of Finnish listed firms on average hold the cash flow rights of about 31.82 percent, 9.28 
percent, and 5.68 percent respectively. 
  19The table also reports that the sample firms have quite high lev
averaging 42.32 percent and 39.46 percent in 1996 and 2000 respectively.
size of the firms is relatively the same for both periods. With respect
relationships with industry-adjusted CFROA, we find that industry-adjust
performanc
el of leverage, 
 Average asset 
 to correlation 
ed CFROA is 
negatively correlated with financial and business risks in both periods. These 
preliminary results suggest that higher business and financial risk may reduce firm 
e. Large firms tend to be outperformed by smaller firms prior to crisis. Firm 
leverage and asset un ant and negative correlation with firm 
performance.  
------------ 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------ 
 of dominant 
ultiple 
reholders. The 
median value of ADJCFROA in 2000 is about 1.37 percent for firms with multiple 
controls, compared to –0.99 percent for firms with single large control, although the 
tional level. Interestingly, in the firms in which 
families or foreign inve gest shareholders, firm performance is 
well above the industry shown in Panel B that, in the firms with 
multiple owners, the higher the control and cash flow rights held by the second largest 
shareholders, the better the firm performance.     
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 5 about here 
iqueness have signific
------------------
Next, Table 5 summarizes firm performance based on types
shareholders and ownership level. In Panel A, it is noticed that the firms with m
large shareholders perform much better than those with single large sha
difference is not significant at conven
stors are the second lar
 average. It is further 
  20------------------------------ 
4.2.1
whether large 
shareholders enhance firm profitability. Comparing the results for 1996 and 2000, Table 
6 indicates that firms in which the largest shareholders have high cash flow rights are 
r incentives to 
coefficient for 
is 1. However, 
ilar results can 
be found in Claessens et al. (2002) who study eight East Asian countries in 1996 and 
find stronger support for the view that firm value increases with cash-flow ownership of 
y affect firm 
lders 
after the crisis in 2000 is positive and significant, indicating that multiple blockholders 
may limit expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling shareholders. 
illustrate that 
ng roles. This 
esence of a strong 
second largest shareholder enhances profitability in German firms. However, it is 
different from Faccio et al. (2001). They find that the presence of multiple large 
shareholders exacerbates expropriation in Asia. Although their study includes Thai firms, 
the authors report that no Thai firms in their study have multiple large shareholders.   
4.2 Regression results 
 The role of large shareholders 
This section first presents multivariate analysis to determine 
more profitable, implying that higher cash flow rights may reduce thei
pursue private benefits at the expense of other shareholders. The 
CFRIGHT1ST is positive and significant, providing support to Hypothes
the evidence is more pronounced in 2000 when compared with 1996. Sim
the largest shareholder. 
We next explore whether other large blockholders positivel
performance. The coefficient associated with the presence of other large shareho
However, the coefficient is not significant in 1996. The results may 
investors come to recognize the importance of monitoring and supervisi
result is similar to Lehman and Weigand (2000) who report that the pr
  21We next take into account the incentives associated with cash flo
second largest shareholder (CFRIGHT2ND). I run the regression using t
rights. T
w rights of the 
heir cash flow 
he result shows that the larger the cash flow rights, the higher the firm 
prof
However, it is still questionable whether the largest and second largest 
shareholders are competing for the control of a firm or informally colluding. Although 
areholders and 
 would prefer 
formation that 
can be used to capture informal relationship, I leave this issue for future research. 
Although it is not possible to identify such relationship, it is plausible to suppose that 
the ability of the contro njoy private benefits of control is limited 
by an increase in owner e shareholders. 
----------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
------------------------------ 
and ownership 
ble 7, Panel B 
confirms the results shown in previous section that the second largest shareholders are 
important to corporate performance improvement after the crisis. However, we now take 
into account the incentives of the second largest shareholder who serves as chairman of 
the board or CEO in a firm. Higher cash flow rights by this shareholder enhance firm 
itability. 
careful identification of formally unrelated shareholders can reduce the potential that 
they may vote in a coalition, it is still possible that the controlling sh
other large shareholders may form an informal link in such a way that they
to collude rather than to play monitoring roles. Since I do not have any in
lling shareholder to e
ship stakes of other larg
-------
4.2.2 Ownership concentration and firm risk 
This section mainly explores the association between firm risk 
concentration on one side and firm performance on the other side. In Ta
  22profitability. The coefficient for CFRIGHT2NDBD is positive and signif
percent level. The result provides support to Hypothesis 2, consis
expectation that multiple large shareholders will have relatively better inf
performance. It may also imply that the concentration of cash flow rights
icant at the 5 
tent with our 
luence on firm 
 by the second 
largest shareholder in Thai firms may act as a substitute for poor legal protection of 
minority non-controlling shareholders in the post-crisis period. The findings in support 
sample. 
lders, the first 
areholders are 
is marginally 
significant for the 2000 sample, but insignificant for the 1996 sample. This suggests that, 
after the 1997 financial crisis, controlling shareholders may have incentives and 
rs. The result 
t hypothesis.   
wed to differ 
based on ownership-based incentive of the largest owner. The results are shown in 
models 2-4 shown in Table 7. In both panels, model 2 uses financial risk variable and its 
concentration 
 ownership as 
posure, the estimate of the interaction 
between risk and ownership should show positive sign. The result shows that financial 
risk is negatively related with firm performance. However, when the largest 
shareholders increase their cash flow rights that proxy for ownership-based incentives, 
this helps alleviate negative effect caused by financial risk.   
of this hypothesis are also robust in other specifications for the post-crisis 
With respect to the incentives of the largest controlling shareho
model in both panels shows that cash flow rights of the controlling sh
positively associated with firm performance. However, the coefficient 
interests that are aligned with the interests of non-controlling shareholde
for the post-crisis sample supports Hypothesis 1, a convergence-of-interes
I then present the regressions in which the effect of risk is allo
interaction with cash flow rights to examine whether ownership 
moderates the relationship between firm risk and performance. If equity
an incentive helps reduce the effect from risk ex
  23Next, I consider separate effect of business risk on firm perform
3. The result shows that the interaction between business risk and cash f
positive sign, implying that the concentration of cash flow rights i
mechanism, which can be used to align the interests between controlling and m
ance in model 
low rights has 
s an effective 
inority 
shareholders, especially after the onset of the 1997 financial crisis when a lot of effort 
has been taken by the authority to promote better corporate governance practices.   
ith ownership 
l risk on firm 
le the effect of 
the result still suggests that high ownership concentration by the largest shareholder is 
positively associated with firm performance in firms that have high-risk exposure. 
ts that reduce 
e too excessive risk and exploit minority 
shar ns, using the 
2-period samples of listed firms that exist in both periods. The regression results are 
qualitatively similar to the results reported, however. 
, in 2000 after 
irm may help 
ance. Greater cash flow 
                                                 
I then account for both types of risk and their interactions w
variable in model 4 of both panels. Interestingly, the effect of financia
performance dominates that of business risk in the pre-crisis sample whi
business risk dominates that of financial risk in the post-crisis sample.
4 Nevertheless, 
Overall, the results support Hypothesis 3 regarding greater cash flow righ
the large shareholders’ incentives to tak
eholders. Note that I also check robustness by running regressio
To summarize, the results in Table 7 offer strong evidence that
the crisis, a controlling shareholder’s large equity wealth vested in a f
weaken the negative association between firm risk and perform
 
4 To check the robustness of the results, I use average value of interest coverage ratio 
between the most two recent years and sales variability to proxy for financial and 
business risk respectively. The concluding results do not change importantly. 
  24rights by both the largest and second largest shareholders reduce their
pursue private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. Reg
variables, there is strong evidence that large firms and high leverage firm
performance before the crisis. In addition, we find only weak evidence
 incentives to 
arding control 
s have poorer 
 that it is not 
efficient for a firm to invest too much in differentiating themselves from the rivals. The 
coefficient for the market power proxy tends to provide a broad support for the positive 
influence of competitive rformance.   
------------ 
4.2.3 Control mechanism and the role duality of the largest shareholder 
The argument that pyramidal and cross-shareholding structures adversely affect 
to the benefits 
hat unwinding 
e, although its 
estimate is only marginally significant in 2000, but not 1996. The evidence weakly 
supports Hypothesis 6, which suggests that the firms, which turn to use direct control 
sh flow rights, 
r performance 
                                                 
 conditions on firm pe
------------------
Insert Table 7 about here 
------------------------------ 
firm performance is tested in this section. Table 8 provides weak support 
from unwinding indirect shareholding structure. All regressions show t
structure (TODIRECT) has a positive association with firm performanc
mechanism that reduces the degree of separation between voting and ca
may benefit from becoming more transparent and consequently have bette
than the firms that do not implement changes.
5  
 
5 Focusing on the difference between control and cash flow rights, Claessens et al. 
(2002) show that separating control and cash flow rights through indirect control 
mechanisms (pyramidal and cross-shareholding structures) can create larger agency 
  25Although the structure can change the culture of a firm, there 
important factor that should be considered, that is, the role of large shar
large shareholder holds top management position, he has signifi
is still another 
eholder. When 
ntrol over the 
ad to the firm.
6 This 
section further focuses on the role duality of the largest controlling shareholder.   
Controlling for firm characteristics, all regressions in Panel B show a strong 
. The firms in 
and CEO have 
onsistent with 
is more likely to be entrenched (Hypothesis 4). In other words, firms with entrenched 
CEOs need more monitoring, but an entrenched CEO may have greater control over the 
ignificant and 
ce of the 
CEO/Chair duality. In addition, when we compare the results with those of the pre-crisis 
sample in Panel A, it is clear that internal control mechanism and the unwinding of 
 effectively in 
                                                                                                                                                 
cant co
firm. His decisions result in the outcomes that can be good or b
and negative association between the role duality and firm performance
which the largest controlling shareholders serve as both board chairman 
poor performance relative to the firms in which they do not. The result is c
entrenched argument, which expects that a CEO who is also the chairman of the board 
board and therefore reduce the efficiency of the board control.   
The result also confirms our descriptive statistics that shows s
negative correlation between industry-adjusted CFROA and the existen
complicated control structures prior to the financial crisis fail to work
influencing firm performance. 
 
costs that are detrimental to firm value. 
6 Kole and Lehn (1999) conclude that corporate culture inhibits the ability of a firm to 
quickly respond to changes. And it is collectively described by internal control 
mechanism of the firm. 
  26------------------------------ 
bout here 
4.2.4
Table 9 investigates the effect of cash flow rights as a commitment to limit the 
expropriation of minority interests by the controlling shareholder who holds the dual 
rger for firms 
 do not hold 
FRIGHT1ST* 
 to that of 
CFRIGHT1ST*OWNDUAL. The former is positive and significant at the 5% percent 
level. To the extent that concentration of cash flow rights in the hands of the controlling 
and non-controlling minority 
shareholders, the result  se in incentives of large shareholders can 
be a way to restrict th ior, thus reducing agency conflicts and 
increasing performance. Thus this provides support to Hypothesis 5. 
------------------------------ 
sk varies with 
their incentives. It is evident that the firms in 1996 were enormously affected by 
business risk. Greater cash flow rights held by the controlling shareholders who hold 
both positions do not reduce the risk effect on firm performance. Nevertheless, 
non-CEO-Chairman shareholders may monitor the firms more to help reduce the risk 
Insert Table 8 a
------------------------------ 
 Ownership concentration and board independence 
role of chairman and CEO. Regression 1 shows that firm profitability is la
with the controlling shareholders who have greater cash flow rights and
dual role responsibilities. The size of the coefficient for C
(1-OWNDUAL) on industry-adjusted CFROA is higher relative
shareholder aligns the interests between controlling 
suggests that an increa
eir self-interest behav
Insert Table 9 about here 
------------------------------ 
Next, we account for the effects of these groups to see if firm ri
  27and 
cts of financial 
k affect firms 
rthermore, it 
appears that, regardless of the positions they hold in firms, when controlling 
shareholders hold more cash flow rights, the incentives to protect the interests that are 
m to be more 
isk and 
indicates that 
rks to alleviate the 
effect from risk exposure. But when both types of risk and their interactions are 
included into the model, the effect of business risk dominates that of financial risk. 
that ownership 
chanism in the 
post-crisis period when the authority attempts to promote better governance practices 
that bring transparency and accountability. This paper highlights the need to look into 
ntral to agency 
 of the largest 
and second largest shareholders is positively associated with firm profitability after the 
financial crisis. Holding greater cash flow rights, the controlling shareholders have more 
incentives to protect their wealth vested into the firm. Thus, this aligns their interests 
with those of other shareholders. However, their concern for risk tends to differ in these 
to enhance firm value. 
For the post-crisis sample, when we separately examine the effe
risk and business risk on firm performance, we find that both types of ris
inversely, consistent with the results described in previous section. Fu
aligned with those of minority shareholders may be higher, causing the
cautious in decision-makings. From the results, the interaction terms between r
cash flow rights are positive and statistically significant. This finding 
ownership concentration as a corporate governance mechanism wo
5.  Conclusion 
Using Thai firm-level data in 1996 and 2000, we have shown 
concentration works effectively as an important corporate governance me
not only the risk of expropriation but also other types of risk that are ce
framework. 
  This paper suggests that ownership concentration in the hands
  28two periods. Financial risk tends to be more important to the firm’s surv
crisis while business risk is significantly focused after the crisis. The pre
large shareholders and the ownership-based incentives o
ival before the 
sence of other 
f the second largest shareholder 
may
  The results partially suggest that the unwinding of complicated control 
structures can be a way to help improve firm performance. This is consistent with the 
echanism is more transparent. 
Furthermore, internal control through the large shareholders who assume the dual roles 
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Distribution of listed firms by industry
Industry No. % No. %
A g r i b u s i n e s s 2 69 . 6 3 1 87 . 3 8
Building materials and Property development 54 20.00 44 18.03
Chemicals and plastics 11 4.07 12 4.92
C o m m e r c e 1 14 . 0 7 1 14 . 5 1
Communication, Energy and Transportation 20 7.41 21 8.61
Electrical products and computers, and Electronic components 15 5.56 13 5.33
Entertainment and recreation 5 1.85 8 3.28
Foods and beverage 23 8.52 21 8.61
Health care services, Hotel, Professional services, and Warehouse and Silo 29 10.74 28 11.48
Household goods 16 5.93 13 5.33
Machinery and equipment, and Vehicles and parts 10 3.70 9 3.69
Packaging 15 5.56 13 5.33
Printing and publishing 9 3.33 8 3.28
Pulp and paper 5 1.85 5 2.05
Textiles, clothing and footwear 21 7.78 20 8.20
Total 270 100.00 244 100.00
1996 2000
This table presents the distribution of non-financial listed firms classified by industry for the years 1996 and 2000. Industry











Distribution of the sample firms by types of shareholders and involvement
N% N%
Panel A: For all firms with the largest controlling shareholders
          Individual/Family 213 78.89 178 72.95
          CPB 5 1.85 5 2.05
          Government 9 3.33 10 4.10
          Foreign investors 43 15.93 51 20.90
Total 270 100.00 244 100.00
Panel B: For firms with single large controlling shareholders
          Individual/Family 150 55.56 113 46.31
          CPB 5 1.85 4 1.64
          Government 5 1.85 4 1.64
          Foreign investors 18 6.67 20 8.20
Total 178 65.93 141 57.79
Panel C: For firms with multiple large shareholders
The first largest shareholders:
          Individual/Family 63 23.33 65 26.64
          CPB 0 0.00 1 0.41
          Government 4 1.48 6 2.46
          Foreign investors 25 9.26 31 12.70
Total 92 34.07 103 42.21
The second largest shareholders:
          Individual/Family 56 20.74 55 22.54
          CPB 7 2.59 4 1.64
          Government 4 1.48 3 1.23
          Foreign investors 25 9.26 41 16.80
Total 92 34.07 103 42.21
Panel D: By involvement
As founder:
     The first largest shareholder 61 22.59 71 29.10
     The second largest shareholder 33 12.22 32 13.11
As board chairman or CEO :
     The first largest shareholder 44 16.30 52 21.31
     The second largest shareholder 14 5.19 23 9.43
This table reports the distribution of firms by types of shareholders and their involvement in 1996 and 2000. Shareholders are
classified into 5 categories which are individual, specially organized CPB, government, foreign non-institutional investors, and
foreign institutional investors. Involvement is presented in terms of being involved as the founder of a firm and as board
chairman or chief executive officer (CEO). The percentage column represents the number of firms for each category divided by










ADJCFROA Cash flow operating return on assets of a firm (CFROA) minus the industry's CFROA
(CFROA = earnings before depreciation, interests and taxes/total assets)
Corporate governance variables:
CFRIGHT1ST Percentage of cash flow rights held by the largest shareholder
CFRIGHT2ND Percentage of cash flow rights held by the second largest shareholder
CFRIGHT2NDBD Percentage of cash flow rights held by the second largest shareholder who serves as board 
chairman or chief executive offer of a firm
DSECONDLAR Dummy variable that takes value one 1if a firm has the second largest shareholder who 
holds at least 10 percent of control rights and zero otherwise. 
OWNDUAL Dummy variable that takes value one if the largest shareholder serves the chairman of the board
and the chief executive officer, and zero otherwise
XXXFAM Dummy variable that takes value one if the second largest shareholder is an individual or 
family and zero otherwise. 
XXXCPB  Dummy variable that takes value one if the second largest shareholder is a specially organized CPB
of the royal family and zero otherwise. 
XXXSTATE Dummy variable that takes value one if the second largest shareholder is the government
and zero otherwise.
XXXFOREIGN  Dummy variable that takes value one if the second largest shareholder is a foreign investor
and zero otherwise.
Control mechanism:
TOINDIRECT Dummy variable that takes value one if control mechanism was changed from direct to indirect
method, and zero otherwise
TODIRECT Dummy variable that takes value one if control mechanism was changed from indirect to direct
method, and zero otherwise
Firm risk:
FINRISK Standard deviation of first differences in return on equity (ROE) over the most recent five years
(ROE=Net Income/Total equity)
BUSRISK Standard deviation of first differences in operating profit margin (OPM) over the most recent five
years (OPM=Earnings before interests and tax/Total sales)
Control variables:
Firm Size Natural logarithm of the book value of total assets
Leverage Natural logarithm of the ratio of total liabilities to total assets
Asset uniqueness The ratio of total selling and administrative expenses to total sales
Capital expenditure The ratio of net capital expenditures to total sales
Market power The value of total sales deducted by the cost of sales divided by total sales averaged over the
most recent five years
The definitions of variables are applied for both the 1996 and 2000 samples. All variables except ownership variables and firm
risk variables are measured as of the end of each sample year. Cash flow rights of the largest and second largest shareholders
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Table 4
Descriptive statistics
Variables Obs. Mean Median Std.  Dev. Corr. Obs. Mean Median Std.  Dev. Corr.
ADJCFROA 270 0.005 0.005 0.06  1.00 244 -0.030 0.003 0.37  1.00
Governance variables:
CFRIGHT1ST 270 39.79 39.81 18.80  0.06 244 41.12 41.01 19.37  0.09
CFRIGHT2ND 270 6.10 0.00 9.32 -0.08 244 7.93 0.00 10.33  0.08
CFRIGHT2NDBD 270 0.75 0.00 4.40  0.02 244 1.63 0.00 5.55  0.04
TOINDIRECT 270 0.08 0.00 0.27 -0.12 244 0.04 0.00 0.19  0.02
TODIRECT 270 0.01 0.00 0.11  0.06 244 0.09 0.00 0.29  0.01
OWNDUAL 270 0.31 0.00 0.46 -0.06 244 0.34 0.00 0.47 -0.15**
Firm risk:
FINRISK 270 0.13 0.06 0.43 -0.20** 244 1.28 0.32 3.35 -0.02
BUSRISK 270 0.15 0.05 0.43 -0.14** 244 0.93 0.15 3.13 -0.29**
Control variables:
Firm size 270 7.77 7.59 1.18 -0.16** 244 7.71 7.51 1.27  0.07
Leverage 270 -0.86 -0.68 0.63 -0.16** 244 -0.93 -0.76 0.88 -0.37**
Asset uniqueness 270 0.20 0.15 0.25 -0.20** 244 0.36 0.16 1.08 -0.64**
Capital expenditure 270 0.25 0.07 1.11 -0.26** 244 -0.08 0.02 2.06  0.06
Market power 270 0.29 0.24 0.20  0.09 244 0.25 0.21 0.20  0.08
** denotes significance at the 5 percent level.
This table provides descriptive statistics for variables used in the analysis, and also shows sample correlations between
explanatory variables and dependent variable.














N ADJCFROA (%) N ADJCFROA (%)
Panel A: By types of dominant shareholders
Firms with single largest controlling shareholders 178 0.235 141 -0.990
Firms with one largest controlling shareholders and 
          at least one large shareholder: 92 1.090 103 1.370
          Individual/Family 56 1.849 55 1.790
          CPB 7 2.271 4 -9.550
          Government 4 0.980 3 -4.010
          Foreign investors 25 -0.400 41 1.460
Total 270 0.475 244 0.340
Panel B: By levels of ownership concentration of 
              the second largest shareholders
Control rights:
                0 - 10 - - - -
              10 - 20 61 1.940 67 0.670
              20 - 25 19 1.960 20 2.385
              More than 25% 12 -2.535 16 2.745
Total 92 1.090 103 1.370
Cash flow rights:
                0 - 10 20 2.410 11 -4.010
              10 - 20 46 1.850 62 1.415
              20 - 25 16 1.180 16 2.385
              More than 25% 10 -2.990 14 1.875
Total 92 1.090 103 1.370
This table presents the median values of industry-adjusted cash flow operating return on assets (ADJCFROA) by types of
dominant shareholders and levels of ownership concentration of the second largest shareholders in Panels A and B respectively. In
Panel A, firms are divided into two groups - firms with a single large shareholder and firms with multiple large shareholders. For
the latter group, the median values are reported based on four sub-groups according to types of the second large shareholders,
which are individual, specially organized CPB, government, foreign non-institutional investors, and foreign institutional investors.
In Panel B, ownership concentration is reported in terms of control and cash flow rights. Concentration levels are divided into 4
ranges - 0-10%, 10-20%, 20-25%, and more than 25%. A controlling shareholder is a shareholder who holds at least 25 percent of
Table 5
Accounting performance
N ADJCFROA (%) N ADJCFROA (%)
Panel A: By types of dominant shareholders
Firms with single largest controlling shareholders 178 0.235 141 -0.990
Firms with one largest controlling shareholders and 
          at least one large shareholder: 92 1.090 103 1.370
          Individual/Family 56 1.849 55 1.790
          CPB 7 2.271 4 -9.550
          Government 4 0.980 3 -4.010
          Foreign investors 25 -0.400 41 1.460
Total 270 0.475 244 0.340
Panel B: By levels of ownership concentration of 
              the second largest shareholders
Control rights:
                0 - 10 - - - -
              10 - 20 61 1.940 67 0.670
              20 - 25 19 1.960 20 2.385
              More than 25% 12 -2.535 16 2.745
Total 92 1.090 103 1.370
Cash flow rights:
                0 - 10 20 2.410 11 -4.010
              10 - 20 46 1.850 62 1.415
              20 - 25 16 1.180 16 2.385
              More than 25% 10 -2.990 14 1.875
Total 92 1.090 103 1.370
This table presents the median values of industry-adjusted cash flow operating return on assets (ADJCFROA) by types of
dominant shareholders and levels of ownership concentration of the second largest shareholders in Panels A and B respectively. In
Panel A, firms are divided into two groups - firms with a single large shareholder and firms with multiple large shareholders. For
the latter group, the median values are reported based on four sub-groups according to types of the second large shareholders,
which are individual, specially organized CPB, government, foreign non-institutional investors, and foreign institutional investors.
In Panel B, ownership concentration is reported in terms of control and cash flow rights. Concentration levels are divided into 4
ranges - 0-10%, 10-20%, 20-25%, and more than 25%. A controlling shareholder is a shareholder who holds at least 25 percent of
control rights. The second large shareholder is a shareholder who holds control rights below those held by the largest controlling




















The role of large shareholders
V a r i a b l e [ 1 ][ 2 ][ 3 ][ 4 ] [ 1 ][ 2 ][ 3 ][ 4 ]
Intercept 0.023 0.027 0.030 0.026 -0.700** -0.744** -0.721** -0.801**
(0.736) (0.846) (0.938) (0.798) (-2.052) (-2.099) (-2.094) (-2.171)
Firm size -0.006* -0.007** -0.007** -0.006* 0.045** 0.038* 0.040* 0.044**




a -0.231** -0.223** -0.226** -0.224**
(-1.664) (-1.633) (-1.609) (-1.633) (-2.244) (-2.245) (-2.224) (-2.228)




(-1.742) (-1.718) (-1.705) (-1.667) (-1.571) (-1.573) (-1.576) (-1.565)
Capital expenditure -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.023* -0.020* -0.021* -0.019
(-3.287) (-3.137) (-3.167) (-3.156) (-1.760) (-1.665) (-1.725) (-1.504)
Market power 0.063*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.060** 0.111 0.157 0.122 0.172
(2.643) (2.635) (2.602) (2.486) (0.602) (0.875) (0.657) (0.934)
CFRIGHT1ST 0.0003
a 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
a 0.005* 0.006* 0.005* 0.006*













Adjusted R-squared 0.1464 0.1441 0.1472 0.1401 0.4838 0.4861 0.4868 0.4819
N 270 270 270 270 244 244 244 244
***, **, * and 
a denote significance at the 1, 5, 10 and 12 percent levels respectively.
This table presents OLS regressions that examine the importance of the role of the second largest shareholders. The dependent
variable is industry-adjusted cash flow return on assets (ADJCFROA). CFRIGHT1ST and CFRIGHT2ND are the percentage of
cash flow rights held by the largest and the second largest shareholders respectively. DSECONDLAR equals 1if a firm has the
second largest shareholder who holds at least 10 percent of control rights and 0 otherwise. XXXFAM equals 1 if the second largest
shareholder is an individual or family and 0 otherwise. XXXCPB equals 1 if the second largest shareholder is a specially organized
CPB and 0 otherwise. XXXSTATE equals 1 if the second largest shareholder is the government and 0 otherwise. XXXFOREIGN
equals 1 if the second largest shareholder is a foreign investor and 0 otherwise. FINRISK is the standard deviation of first difference
in return on equity during the five most recent years. BUSRISK is the standard deviation of first difference in operating profit
margin during the five most recent years. Firm size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Leverage is the natural logarithm of the
ratio of total liabilites to total assets. Asset uniqueness is the ratio of selling and administrative expenses to total sales. Capital
expenditure is net capital expenditures divided by total sales. Market power is sales minus cost of sales expressed as a percentage of
Table 6
The role of large shareholders
V a r i a b l e [ 1 ][ 2 ][ 3 ][ 4 ] [ 1 ][ 2 ][ 3 ][ 4 ]
Intercept 0.023 0.027 0.030 0.026 -0.700** -0.744** -0.721** -0.801**
(0.736) (0.846) (0.938) (0.798) (-2.052) (-2.099) (-2.094) (-2.171)
Firm size -0.006* -0.007** -0.007** -0.006* 0.045** 0.038* 0.040* 0.044**




a -0.231** -0.223** -0.226** -0.224**
(-1.664) (-1.633) (-1.609) (-1.633) (-2.244) (-2.245) (-2.224) (-2.228)




(-1.742) (-1.718) (-1.705) (-1.667) (-1.571) (-1.573) (-1.576) (-1.565)
Capital expenditure -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.023* -0.020* -0.021* -0.019
(-3.287) (-3.137) (-3.167) (-3.156) (-1.760) (-1.665) (-1.725) (-1.504)
Market power 0.063*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.060** 0.111 0.157 0.122 0.172
(2.643) (2.635) (2.602) (2.486) (0.602) (0.875) (0.657) (0.934)
CFRIGHT1ST 0.0003
a 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
a 0.005* 0.006* 0.005* 0.006*













Adjusted R-squared 0.1464 0.1441 0.1472 0.1401 0.4838 0.4861 0.4868 0.4819
N 270 270 270 270 244 244 244 244
***, **, * and 
a denote significance at the 1, 5, 10 and 12 percent levels respectively.
This table presents OLS regressions that examine the importance of the role of the second largest shareholders. The dependent
variable is industry-adjusted cash flow return on assets (ADJCFROA). CFRIGHT1ST and CFRIGHT2ND are the percentage of
cash flow rights held by the largest and the second largest shareholders respectively. DSECONDLAR equals 1if a firm has the
second largest shareholder who holds at least 10 percent of control rights and 0 otherwise. XXXFAM equals 1 if the second largest
shareholder is an individual or family and 0 otherwise. XXXCPB equals 1 if the second largest shareholder is a specially organized
CPB and 0 otherwise. XXXSTATE equals 1 if the second largest shareholder is the government and 0 otherwise. XXXFOREIGN
equals 1 if the second largest shareholder is a foreign investor and 0 otherwise. FINRISK is the standard deviation of first difference
in return on equity during the five most recent years. BUSRISK is the standard deviation of first difference in operating profit
margin during the five most recent years. Firm size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Leverage is the natural logarithm of the
ratio of total liabilites to total assets. Asset uniqueness is the ratio of selling and administrative expenses to total sales. Capital
expenditure is net capital expenditures divided by total sales. Market power is sales minus cost of sales expressed as a percentage of
sales. The values of White heteroskedastic-consistent t-statistics appear in parentheses below each estimate.















Ownership concentration and firm risk
Variable [1] [2] [3] [4] [1] [2] [3] [4]
Intercept 0.024 0.042 0.018 0.035 -0.763** -0.781** 0.003 -0.043
(0.750) (1.357) (0.539) (1.104) (-2.133) (-2.407) (0.020 (-0.292)
Firm size -0.006* -0.007** -0.005
a -0.006* 0.046** 0.053** -0.007 -0.005
(-1.929) (-2.230) (-1.642) (-1.956) (2.093) (2.184) (-0.513) (-0.329)
Leverage -0.015* -0.012 -0.014 -0.011 -0.239** -0.270*** -0.116*** -0.132***
(-1.660) (-1.409) (-1.527) (-1.295) (-2.276) (-2.574) (-3.409) (-3.516)
Asset uniqueness -0.053* -0.049* -0.040 -0.038 -0.413
a -0.468** -0.697*** -0.699***
(-1.740) (-1.687) (-1.305) (-1.299) (-1.573) (-2.029) (-4.681) (-4.774)
Capital expenditure -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.024
a -0.026** -0.101** -0.099**
(-3.274) (-3.420) (-3.265) (-3.435) (-1.809) (-2.112) (-2.091) (-2.059)
Market power 0.063*** 0.060** 0.073*** 0.069*** 0.132 0.246 0.320** 0.345***
(2.633) (2.519) (2.912) (2.751) (0.726) (1.530) (2.409) (2.578)
CFRIGHT2NDBD -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.010** 0.013** 0.011** 0.011**
(-0.176) (-0.211) (-0.211) (-0.236) (2.401) (2.423) (2.470) (2.429)
CFRIGHT1ST 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.005* 0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(1.543) (0.853) (1.264) (0.723) (1.827) (1.073) (-1.011) (-1.470)
FINRISK -0.092** -0.087** -0.133* -0.017
(-2.518) (-2.295) (-1.667) (-0.740)
FINRISK*CFRIGHT 0.001* 0.001* 0.005* 0.001
(1.868) (1.703) (1.732) (1.137)
BUSRISK -0.043* -0.034 -0.291*** -0.279***
(-1.815) (-1.495) (-3.406) (-3.306)
BUSRISK*CFRIGHT 0.0005 0.0003 0.009*** 0.009***
(1.185) (0.896) (4.202) (4.082)
Adjusted R-squared 0.1432 0.1791 0.1513 0.1839 0.4881 0.5447 0.7732 0.7749
N 270 270 270 270 244 244 244 244
***, **, * and 
a denote significance at the 1, 5, 10 and 12 percent levels respectively.
(A) 1996 Sample (B) 2000 Sample
This table presents OLS regressions that examine the effects of firm risk and ownership concentration on firm performance. The
dependent variable is industry-adjusted cash flow return on assets (ADJCFROA). CFRIGHT1ST represents the percentage of cash
flow rights held by the largest shareholders. CFRIGHT2NDBD represents the percentage of cash flow rights held by the second
largest shareholders who serves as board chairman or CEO. FINRISK is the standard deviation of first difference in return on
equity during the five most recent years. BUSRISK is the standard deviation of first difference in operating profit margin during the
five most recent years. Firm size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Leverage is the natural logarithm of the ratio of total
liabilites to total assets. Asset uniqueness is the ratio of selling and administrative expenses to total sales. Capital expenditure is net
capital expenditures divided by total sales. Market power is sales minus cost of sales expressed as a percentage of sales. The values










Unwinding of indirect shareholding structure
[1] [2] [3] [4] [1] [2] [3] [4]
Intercept 0.025 0.042 0.020 0.035 -0.688** -0.720** 0.006 -0.034
(0.801) (1.334) (0.615) (1.104) (-2.126) (-2.362) (0.042 (-0.239)
Firm size -0.006* -0.007** -0.005
a -0.006* 0.038* 0.046** -0.009 -0.007
(-1.899) (-2.174) (-1.628) (-1.910) (1.936) (2.035) (-0.646) (-0.479)
Leverage -0.015
a -0.012 -0.014 -0.012 -0.214** -0.248*** -0.108*** -0.123***
(-1.632) (-1.409) (-1.500) (-1.296) (-2.357) (-2.625) (-3.325) (-3.450)
Asset uniqueness -0.047 -0.045 -0.034 -0.034 -0.430* -0.478** -0.703*** -0.704***
(-1.544) (-1.555) (-1.103) (-1.155) (-1.687) (-2.105) (-4.790) (-4.862)
Capital expenditure -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.027* -0.029** -0.100** -0.098**
(-3.447) (-3.582) (-3.376) (-3.549) (-1.931) (-2.199) (-2.113) (-2.083)
Market power 0.060** 0.058** 0.070*** 0.067*** 0.144 0.247 0.319** 0.342**
(2.529) (2.441) (2.842) (2.700) (0.792) (1.538) (2.332) (2.499)
CFRIGHT2NDBD -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.008** 0.010** 0.010** 0.010**
(-0.169) (-0.207) (-0.205) (-0.233) (2.105) (2.233) (2.298) (2.263)
CFRIGHT1ST 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.006* 0.002* -0.0004 -0.001
(1.668) (1.019) (1.370) (0.873) (1.948) (1.787) (-0.311) (-0.695)
FINRISK -0.086** -0.082** -0.126
a -0.016
(-2.231) (-2.028) (-1.644) (-0.739)
FINRISK*CFRIGHT1ST 0.001
a 0.001 0.005* 0.001
(1.633) (1.490) (1.717) (1.090)
BUSRISK -0.048** -0.039* -0.284*** -0.273***
(-2.193) (-1.776) (-3.394) (-3.292)
BUSRISK*CFRIGHT1ST 0.001
a 0.0004 0.009*** 0.009***
(1.570) (1.175) (4.197) (4.071)
TODIRECT 0.037 0.034 0.036 0.034 0.282
a 0.232
a 0.178* 0.165*
(1.422) (1.292) (1.387) (1.268) (1.561) (1.562) (1.762) (1.670)
TOINDIRECT -0.018 -0.012 -0.018 -0.012 0.072 0.047 0.021 0.021
(-1.440) (-1.133) (-1.405) (-1.106) (0.745) (0.515) (0.364) (0.388)
OWNDUAL -0.010 -0.008 -0.011 -0.009 -0.173** -0.140** -0.056* -0.056*
(-1.188) (-0.976) (-1.345) (-1.114) (-2.383) (-2.491) (-1.697) (-1.720)
Adjusted R-squared 0.1472 0.1783 0.1560 0.1837 0.5052 0.5545 0.7761 0.7772
N 270 270 270 270 244 244 244 244
***, **, * and 
a denote significance at the 1, 5, 10 and 12 percent levels respectively.
(A) 1996 Sample (B) 2000 Sample
This table presents OLS regressions that further examine the importance of transparent control structure. The dependent
variable is industry-adjusted cash flow return on assets (ADJCFROA). CFRIGHT1ST represents the percentage of cash flow
rights held by the largest shareholders. CFRIGHT2NDBD represents the percentage of cash flow rights held by the second
largest shareholders who serves as board chairman or CEO. FINRISK is the standard deviation of first difference in return on
equity during the five most recent years. BUSRISK is the standard deviation of first difference in operating profit
margin during the five most recent years. TODIRECT is a dummy variable equal to 1 if control mechanism in a firm was
changed from indirect to direct method and 0 otherwise. TOINDIRECT is a dummy variable equal to 1 if control mechanism
was changed from direct to indirect method and 0 otherwise. OWNDUAL is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the largest owner
serves as the chairman of the board and the chief executive officer and 0 otherwise. Firm size is the natural logarithm of total
assets. Leverage is the natural logarithm of the ratio of total liabilites to total assets. Asset uniqueness is the ratio of selling and
administrative expenses to total sales. Capital expenditure is net capital expenditures divided by total sales. Market power is
sales minus cost of sales expressed as a percentage of sales. The values of White heteroskedastic-consistent t-statistics appear





Board independence and ownership-based incentives of the largest controlling shareholders
[1] [2] [3] [4] [1] [2] [3] [4]
Intercept 0.023 0.039 0.017 0.031 -0.741** -0.750** -0.037 -0.076
(0.739) (1.249) (0.513) (0.991) (-2.145) (-2.358) (-0.247) (-0.479)
Firm size -0.006* -0.007** -0.005
a -0.006** 0.039** 0.046* -0.007 -0.005
(-1.935) (-2.301) (-1.587) (-1.998) (1.965) (1.953) (-0.494) (-0.349)
Leverage -0.015* -0.012 -0.014 -0.012 -0.219** -0.252*** -0.113*** -0.128***
(-1.647) (-1.408) (-1.526) (-1.303) (-2.333) (-2.609) (-3.118) (-3.199)
Asset uniqueness -0.046 -0.043 -0.029 -0.030 -0.434* -0.482** -0.690*** -0.691***
(-1.535) (-1.531) (-0.877) (-0.948) (-1.683) (-2.104) (-4.644) (-4.689)
Capital expenditure -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.025* -0.027** -0.113** -0.111**
(-3.480) (-3.617) (-3.371) (-3.570) (-1.802) (-2.074) (-2.215) (-2.168)
Market power 0.059** 0.057** 0.068*** 0.065*** 0.143 0.247 0.329** 0.351***
(2.486) (2.391) (2.709) (2.610) (0.779) (1.533) (2.435) (2.592)
CFRIGHT2NDBD -0.0001 -0.00004 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.009** 0.011** 0.010*** 0.010***
(-0.202) (-0.064) (-0.255) (-0.096) (2.191) (2.314) (2.601) (2.582)
CFRIGHT1ST*OWNDUAL 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.004* 0.0012 -0.0004 -0.001
(0.721) (0.516) (0.410) (0.326) (1.699) (1.109) (-0.280) (-0.480)
CFRIGHT1ST*(1-OWNDUAL) 0.0005** 0.0005* 0.0004* 0.0005
a 0.007** 0.003* -0.0004 -0.001
(2.056) (1.760) (1.694) (1.634) (1.940) (1.819) (-0.283) (-0.635)
FINRISK -0.037 -0.030 -0.120
a -0.014
(-0.574) (-0.469) (-1.593) (-0.773)
FINRISK*CFRIGHT1ST*OWNDUAL 0.0004 0.0003 0.004
a 0.001
(0.290) (0.214) (1.617) (1.147)
FINRISK*CFRIGHT1ST*(1-OWNDUAL) -0.001 -0.001 0.005* 0.001
(-0.488) (-0.534) (1.721) (1.095)
BUSRISK -0.065** -0.050* -0.266** -0.256**
(-2.271) (-1.953) (-2.554) (-2.453)
BUSRISK*CFRIGHT1ST*OWNDUAL 0.001 0.0005 0.008* 0.007
a
(1.559) (1.292) (1.663) (1.566)
BUSRISK*CFRIGHT1ST*(1-OWNDUAL) 0.001* 0.001 0.009*** 0.008***
(1.672) (1.345) (3.630) (3.481)
TODIRECT 0.038 0.035 0.037 0.034 0.291
a 0.226 0.175* 0.159
a
(1.381) (1.250) (1.329) (1.211) (1.575) (1.515) (1.756) (1.606)
TOINDIRECT -0.018 -0.012 -0.016 -0.010 0.049 0.033 0.018 0.020
(-1.390) (-1.072) (-1.160) (-0.903) (0.509) (0.345) (0.310) (0.347)
Adjusted R-squared 0.1537 0.1873 0.1618 0.1911 0.4990 0.5491 0.7758 0.7759
N 270 270 270 270 244 244 244 244
***, **, * and 
a denote significance at the 1, 5, 10 and 12 percent levels respectively.
(B) 2000 Sample (A) 1996 Sample
This table presents OLS regressions that examine the importance of board independence and incentives in alleviating the impacts of risk on
firm performance. The dependent variable for each regression is industry-adjusted cash flow return on assets (ADJCFROA). CFRIGHT1ST
represents the percentage of cash flow rights held by the largest shareholders. CFRIGHT2NDBD represents the percentage of cash flow
rights held by the second largest shareholders who serves as board chairman or CEO. FINRISK is the standard deviation of first differences
in return on equity during the five most recent years. BUSRISK is the standard deviation of first differences in operating profit
margin during the five most recent years. TODIRECT is a dummy variable equal to 1 if control mechanism in a firm was changed from
indirect to direct method and 0 otherwise. TOINDIRECT is a dummy variable equal to 1 if control mechanism was changed from direct to
indirect method and 0 otherwise. OWNDUAL is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the largest owner serves as the chairman of the board and
the chief executive officer and 0 otherwise. Firm size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Leverage is the natural logarithm of the ratio of
total liabilites to total assets. Asset uniqueness is the ratio of selling and administrative expenses to total sales. Capital expenditure is net
capital expenditures divided by total sales. Market power is sales minus cost of sales expressed as a percentage of sales. The values of White
heteroskedastic-consistent t-statistics appear in parentheses below each estimate.
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